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Establishing an Independent Legal Aid Authority in Hong Kong: Lessons from 
Overseas Jurisdictions 
 
Professor Alan Paterson
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 This report is an interview based comparative study of the independence 
(institutional, operational and financial)
2
 of Legal Aid Authorities ( LAA) in a range 
of advanced jurisdictions. It forms part of a larger report to the Hong Kong Legal Aid 
Services Council (LASC) who have commissioned the project. This part of the 
project sought, inter alia, to establish “the exact working relationship between the 
Government and the legal aid bodies and to determine the actual degree of 
independence of the latter” in each of the jurisdictions. In so doing the report  
analyses the independence of legal aid authorities with respect to a range of factors:  
the legal status of the legal aid authorities and their Boards (if any), accountability, 
staffing, the independence of the process of granting or refusing legal aid, 
responsibility for legal aid policy, and budgeting and finance.  
 
2. The legal status of Legal Aid Authorities 
2.1 LAA can be ranged along a spectrum of institutional autonomy from their sponsoring 
Government Ministry. At one end is the Netherlands Legal Aid Board which is pure 
creature of legislation with a unique legal persona making it an independent (public) 
management body, like a private corporation except (1) that its funding all comes 
from the Ministry of Security and Justice (MOJ) or client contributions, and (2) it is 
accountable to the Ministry of Security and Justice (MOJ). Only marginally less 
autonomous is the non-departmental public body ( NDPB ) model adopted by LAA in 
the Scotland, Ireland,
3
 Ontario,
4
 British Columbia (BC),
5
 Victoria and New South 
Wales (NSW) where the LAA is a body corporate established by statute which sits 
outside their sponsoring Government Ministry. “Independent of, but accountable to” 
as it has been described.  Locating the LAA as an independent body corporate outside 
the Government stems from a widespread belief that there are a range of areas in 
public life where it is unwise for the Government to be seen to be making all the 
decisions. Where a person wishes legal aid to sue the Government or to judicially 
                                                 
1
 The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance which he has received from interviews with  senior 
legal aid officials in Scotland, England & Wales, Northern Ireland, Ireland, The Netherlands, Finland, New 
Zealand, Ontario, British Columbia, Victoria and New South Wales. Responsibility for any errors remains 
with the author. 
2
 Institutional independence refers to the autonomy of the Legal Aid Authority from its sponsoring Ministry 
in terms of its location inside or outside Government. Operational independence refers to the LAA‟s 
autonomy from Government ( and other influences ) in relation to the granting or refusing of legal aid. 
Financial independence refers to the LAA‟s autonomy from others in relation to its funding. 
3
 The Irish LAB is technically an agency of the MOJ but it is situated outside the MOJ.  
4
 LA Ontario is described as  an operational agency of the Government of Ontario but it is outside the 
Government.  
5
 Described as a Crown Corporation which is not a Government agency.  
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review the acts of Government Departments or where the Government wishes to cap 
the legal aid fund in times of austerity there are advantages both for the Government 
and for the public if the allocation of financial assistance to individual applicants for 
legal aid is not in the hands of the Government.
6
 Similarly, where the state is the 
prosecutor in a criminal case it strengthens democratic legitimacy through the rule of 
law and the independence of the justice system if those responsible for funding the 
defence are outside Government. 
 
2.2 On paper, the least autonomous LAA of the jurisdictions surveyed was Finland 
because it is located within Government, being a division of the Ministry of Justice 
(MOJ). It has no special status in the Ministry from the other divisions (Courts, 
prosecution, law enforcement) and no special protections with respect to 
independence. However, in the last few years the Governments in New Zealand ( NZ) 
and England & Wales (E & W) have moved their LAA from NDPB status outside 
Government to a Government agency within the sponsoring Ministry.
7
(In each case 
the Governments took the view that the LAAs had lost control of aspects of their 
budgets ).
8
 Further, a Government initiated review in Northern Ireland (NI)
9
 has 
recommended that it too should become a Government agency within its sponsoring 
Ministry, the Justice Department, although there the stated reasons are to give the 
Government control over policy and to tackle staffing problems in a small 
jurisdiction. The Hong Kong Legal Aid Services Council on the other hand has three 
times in the last 20 years commissioned reports
10
 as to whether the LAA there should 
be moved out of the Government Department and become an NDPB.  
 
 Boards / Advisory Councils 
 
2.3 All of the jurisdictions whose LAA is outside their sponsoring Ministry have a Board  
or Advisory Council. The Netherlands is the most unusual since its Board consists of 
the two Directors of Legal Aid who are both executive directors. They are appointed 
by the Minister of Security and Justice but there is no independent public 
appointments procedure for these posts. In future they will be filled by advertisement 
and interview but the Minister will not be required to accept the panel‟s nomination. 
Appointment as Director is for four year which can be renewed for a further four 
years. In practice the Minister cannot sack the Directors unless they are flagrantly 
incompetent or are convicted of a serious crime. This provides considerable 
independence to the Directors and the Legal Aid Board. There is an Advisory 
                                                 
6
 This gives the Government the important protection of deniability – the decision was not taken by us, but 
by an independent body, the LAA.   
7
 The change occurred in New Zealand in 2011 and in England and Wales on 1st April 2013.  
8
 M. Bazely Transforming the Legal Aid System - Final Report 2009, I. Magee, Review of Legal Aid 
Delivery and Governance 2010. 
9
 Access to Justice Review, Northern Ireland. August 2011. Summary of Responses and Way Forward: 
Safeguards to protect the individual decisions on the granting of civil legal aid consultation ( NI 
Department of Justice, June 2013 ). The Treasury may also have had concerns over the fact that the 
expenditure per capita on legal aid in NI is amongst the highest in the world.  
10
 For an account of the first two initiatives see Legal Aid in Hong Kong ( Hong Kong, Legal Aid Services 
Council, 2006) chapter 1. 
3 
 
Council (with a composition set down in the legislation ) chosen by the Minister with 
no set procedure. The board can offer suitable names to the Minister. The Council 
receives all of the data and information which the Board gives to the MOJ and are 
regularly consulted by the Directors but it has no executive powers and the Directors 
need not take their advice.   
 
2.4 With the exception of Victoria (which now has a five person part-executive Board)   
there is considerable similarity in the size and composition of the other Boards. 
Generally speaking they consist of around ten members and a Chair, drawn from 
various stakeholder communities (the judiciary, solicitors, barristers, the courts, 
community groups and the business world) and the legislation will frequently specify 
the skills set required of the Board, which will always include some with an 
understanding of budgets and management. Only one (Ireland) specifies that there 
must be an approximate gender balance on the Board. Appointment of Board 
members is usually by the Minister of the sponsoring Government department. 
Under the standard NDPB model the CEO and senior management staff are 
responsible for operational matters
11
 relating to the LAA (e.g. grant giving or 
payments to providers) whilst the Board and Chair are responsible for governance, 
namely, ensuring that the LAA operates in accordance with the Board‟s statutory 
remit, policies, procedures, budgeting and the law. By making the Board (rather than 
the Minister) responsible for the hiring and firing of the CEO the model provides a 
measure of institutional and operational autonomy for the CEO and staff from the 
Minister, whilst  providing the necessary accountability through the Chair and Board 
to the Minister and Parliament. In addition, in Scotland and Northern Ireland the 
CEO tends to be selected by the Chief civil servant in the Government as the 
Accountable or Accounting Officer. The Accountable / Accounting  Officer is 
responsible to the Parliament for the LAA‟s expenditure, signing the accounts and 
achieving best value. This enables the CEO to act as a check on financial decisions 
of the Board that he /she considers to be risky. Equally the Board and Chair can hold 
the CEO to account for his or her actions. In the Scotland and Northern Ireland this 
mutual system of checks is thought to help the CEO‟s autonomy from both the 
Government and the LAA. 
 
2.5 The efficacy of the NDPB model in providing operational independence and political 
accountability in part turns on the degree of control exercised by Governments over 
the appointments and removal of the Board and its senior staff. Here there are 
widespread variations in the selected jurisdictions.  In terms of members of the 
Board, in every jurisdiction this is in the hands of the relevant Minister ( with the 
partial exception of British Columbia),
12
 however, in five of these ( BC, Ontario, NI, 
Scotland and Victoria ) there is a public appointments procedure which largely 
prevents political or Governmental interference, whilst in the remaining two (Ireland  
                                                 
11
 The rigid divide between operational matters and governance is not always easy to adhere to, and in 
some instances members of the Board have been asked to perform operational tasks e.g in Scotland where 
Board members serve on Committees (with outside lawyers ) to review decisions of staff members of the 
board to refuse legal aid or to withdraw it.   
12
 In British Columbia, 4 members of the Board are appointed by the legal profession and 5 by the Minister. 
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and NSW) there is not. However in those two (and in others ) some or all  of the 
positions will be filled by stakeholder nomination or board suggestion. Whilst 
nomination curbs the potential for Government threats to independence it opens the 
door to members acting to protect sectoral interests or the status quo in terms of the 
balance of stakeholder interests on the Board.  Chairs, too, are appointed by the 
Minister
13
 under the same procedures, although nomination has less of a role to play.  
 
2.6 In relation to CEOs the NDPB model is generally adhered to, with selection by the 
Board after competitive interview,
14
 with the exception of Victoria, NSW and the 
Netherlands where appointment is in the hands of the Minister. Generally speaking 
CEOs will have a fixed term contract which can be renewed.
15
  Non-renewal is a 
legitimate sanction for poor performance as is removal for complete incompetence or 
misconduct. More concerning from an independence perspective is the position in 
Victoria and NSW which allows the Minister to remove the CEO more or less at 
will, with little or no notice. It is widely believed that the CEO for NSW was 
removed by the Attorney General (AG) in September 2011 for being too independent 
of his Minister. Even the NDPB model does not guarantee independence. In New 
Zealand, following a scathing (though not entirely substantiated ) report
16
 on the 
operation of legal aid, two thirds of the LAA and the CEO resigned, having been 
asked by the Minister to consider their positions. Even more strikingly, the AG 
dismissed the whole Board of the BC LAA in 2001 ( with the CEO stepping down 
very shortly thereafter )  for failing to accept a proposed cut in the legal aid budget of 
38% over three years.
17
  
 
2.7 Neither in Finland nor in England and Wales or New Zealand (now) is there a Board 
(advisory or executive). When the NI LAA (the LSC ) moves into the Justice 
Department, the independent Board will go, replaced by a management board 
consisting of the CEO, the top management and a non-executive director. The 
review
18
 suggested that in addition there should be an Advisory Council established 
by statute to ensure the independence of decision-making of the Agency, to act as an 
appeals panel for complex and difficult cases and as a source of independent advice 
for the Minister on Access to Justice matters. The lay chair might also serve as non-
executive director on the management board. This was in accord with the Hong 
Kong LASC model. However, the 2013 proposals
19
 now make no reference to an 
Advisory Council. Instead they endorse the English and Welsh proposal of a civil 
servant – probably the CEO of the Agency – acting as the statutory office holder 
                                                 
13
 In British Columbia, however, the Chair is elected by the Board. 
14
 In Scotland, although the CEO is employed by the Board, their appointment and removal would be 
matters with which the Minister has to agree. 
15
 Although in Scotland and Northern Ireland they tend to have permanent contracts subject to appropriate 
performance. 
16
 M. Bazely Transforming the Legal Aid System - Final Report 2009 
17
 In the following year the Law Society censured the AG for his actions. 
18
 Access to Justice Review, Northern Ireland. August 2011 par 7.22. 
19
 Summary of Responses and Way Forward: Safeguards to protect the individual decisions on the granting 
of civil legal aid consultation ( NI Department of Justice, June 2013 ). 
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being responsible for individual grants and refusals of legal aid.  The final shape of 
the proposed NI Agency has not yet been determined.  
 
2.8 External observers (including several CEOs from other jurisdictions ) are sceptical 
that the new model for NZ, NI and E & W will be sufficiently autonomous, even if 
the power to grant, refuse or withdraw legal aid in individual cases is adequately 
protected (see below ). Their concerns are rooted not just in experience but stem 
from an appreciation of the difficulties facing a civil servant in a Department whose 
promotion prospects depend on more senior civil servants within the same 
Department who may not see excessive independence from the Minister as being a 
meritorious quality.    
 
 3. Accountability and Independent monitoring 
3.1 In accordance with the NDPB model, in the LAA that were surveyed, accountability 
was from the CEO as accountable officer (particularly for the budget) either (1)  to 
the Board and Chair who in turn are accountable to the sponsoring Minister and to 
the Parliament or (2) directly to the Parliament for financial matters and on other 
matters through the Board and Chair.
20
 This includes the provision of financial 
information and trend data at regular intervals and an Annual Report (AR). The latter 
may go direct to Parliament or sometimes by way of the Minister and then to 
Parliament (Ireland, Victoria, British Columbia). Whilst the indirect route might be 
thought to reduce the autonomy of the LAA (because of the potential for Ministerial 
objection to the contents of AR which are critical of the Governments policies or 
actions in the field), in practical terms the autonomy of the LAA is only marginally 
affected by the route taken by the AR. This is because sometimes the Minister has no 
power to interfere with the content of the AR or to delay its submission (NI). More 
often it is because the LAA will strive for very good reasons to maintain a reasonable 
working relationship with their sponsoring Ministry, both  because that is where the 
great bulk of the funding comes from, and because they wish the Minister to accept 
their advice on policy matters 
 
3.2 It follows that even the most institutionally independent LAA will generally provide 
the Minister with a preview of the Annual Report  or of any elements within in it 
which are critical of the Government‟s policies or actions. Sometimes the LAA and 
the Minister will agree to differ over a matter of contention e.g. the low level of 
financial eligibility in civil cases, but it is rare by the time the AR reaches the 
Parliament for the critical comment to come as a surprise to the Minister and it is not 
unusual for it to have been watered down in some respects. This may suggest that 
accountability brings with it some tempering of independence. Certainly it is the 
case, as with judicial independence and judicial accountability, that there is a tension 
between the two imperatives. However, particularly where the LAA is an NDPB 
whose Board, Chair and CEO have a robust security of tenure, the pursuit of a 
reasonable working relationship with the Minister can provide formal and informal 
                                                 
20
 CEOs and Chairs of LAA are often  asked to appear before Parliamentary Committees to answer 
questions related to legal aid. 
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accountability with very little threat to institutional, operational or financial 
autonomy.  
  
3.3 In relation to monitoring, one or two of the LAA are required to account separately 
on financial matters to the Treasury or Finance Ministry but more commonly the 
LAA are subject to regular audit by independent auditors or the Public Audit Office. 
Both sets of auditors concentrate on financial issues but in the case of the latter, 
elements of propriety, governance and best value will be looked at including random 
samples of files.. Whilst the auditors might check to see that the client was eligible 
for legal aid this will be a cursory process since few auditors will have mastered the 
complex provisions relating to the merits and reasonableness tests. Most of their 
scrutiny will be directed to payments and checking that they conform to the LAA‟s 
policies and regulations. The only other form of independent monitoring is peer 
review of a random sample of files which exists for all legal aid practitioners in 
Scotland, a large sample of practitioners in England & Wales, and to a small 
percentage of files and practitioners in the Netherlands and Finland. 
  
 4. Staffing 
    
4.1 In jurisdictions where the LAA is located within the sponsoring Ministry (HK, NZ, E 
& W) the staff of the LAA are civil servants whether or not they are also lawyers. 
This entails that they are subject to the normal discipline provisions for civil 
servants, that they receive the same salaries and pension entitlements as other civil 
servants and that they have unrestricted access to promotion or transfers to other 
parts of the civil service. The Ministry will also determine the number and grade of 
the staff even where (as in Finland)  most of the legal aid staff are employed by and 
located in one of the local legal aid offices.
21
 For the other jurisdictions which have 
an LAA outside the Ministry the staff are typically not civil servants (Ireland is an 
exception with its staff being a mixture of civil servants
22
 and public servants)
23
  
although in some jurisdictions (e.g Ontario ) they are classified as public servants 
with some similarities to civil servants in terms of discipline and ethics if not in 
terms of salary and pension.  
 
4.2  Where the staff are not civil servants their salary may match those of civil servants 
(but not always)
24
 but they rarely have equivalent pension entitlements. Even more 
problematic is the fact that, particularly in the smaller jurisdictions, the NDPB LAA 
can be so small that the scope for promotion or a career progression is sufficiently 
                                                 
21
 There are currently 41 such offices in Finland but the MOJ is looking to consolidate them into fewer 
centres. 
22
 The civil servants, however,  are subject to the Board‟s internal discipline procedures rather than those of 
the civil service. 
23
 Public servants are employees who are subject to some of the same restraints and discipline as civil 
servants but with different salary and pension arrangements. In Ireland they tend to be specialists e.g. 
lawyers rather than the generalists, who are civil servants. 
24
 In England & Wales the LSC staff were better paid than civil servants – which caused some 
complications when the LSC became a Government agency in 2013. 
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limited that there can be recruitment problems at the senior level.
25
 (This was one of 
the factors which encouraged the recent NI review
26
 to recommend that the NDPB 
LAA in NI should become a Government agency with its staff becoming civil 
servants).  Most difficult of all in terms of autonomy is the fact that civil servants 
often have a rather different culture from public servants or LAA workers.  
 
4.3 As one senior staff member who had experience of working inside and outside the 
civil service, observed, there is a fundamental difference between an NDPB and a 
Government Agency in terms of the client. With the NDPB the “sharp end” is the 
customer or citizen for whose benefit the NDPB exists. In the case of the Agency the 
client / sharp end is the Minister and your job as a civil servant is to protect and serve 
the Minister. This means that policy may change more quickly in an Agency if the 
Minister changes. On the other hand, just because the LAA is outside the 
Government and its staff are not civil servants does not ensure autonomy for the 
LAA since in some jurisdictions the Ministry retains the power to limit staff 
numbers, and pay, sometimes keeping the salary of the LAA lawyers below that of 
lawyers in the Ministry, thus causing recruitment and retention problems. In Ireland 
whether the staff are civil servants or public servants they are employed by the LAB 
but their number and grade is the product of negotiations between the MOJ and the 
Ministry of Finance.
27
   
  
 
 Salaried or in-house lawyers 
 
4.4  It is occasionally asserted – often by the private profession – that public defender 
lawyers employed by LAA in criminal cases are lacking in independence or 
perceived independence, especially if the LAA is located within the Ministry (where 
it may be in the same cluster as the prosecution department).
28
 Leaving aside the fact 
that such complaints can be influenced by the private profession‟s objections to what 
they regard as unfair competition from the existence of public defenders – objections 
which the state tends to see as evidence of anti-competitivism – Finland and New 
Zealand have acted to dispel such criticism. In Finland the assisted client has a free 
choice between the public lawyer and the private lawyer. In New Zealand the 200 or 
so public defenders have been placed under two regional Public Defenders and the 
Public Defender for New Zealand. The last reports to the Secretary for Justice and 
then to the Minister. It is not clear that this will be sufficient to counter the perceived 
threat to independence of action now that the NZ LAA is inside the Ministry of 
Justice.  
 
                                                 
25
 The problems included a lack of flexibility when new skills sets were required. 
26
 Access to Justice Review, Northern Ireland. August 2011 para 7.20. 
27
The civil servants have their salary, grades and pension determined by the civil service. They tend to be 
generalists and have mobility. The public servants tend to be specialists, often lawyers, though their pay 
and pension are similarly determined and they are less mobile. Because of austerity measures, notably a 
Public Service staff embargo, staff who leave through retirement or otherwise are not replaced.    
28
 However, public defenders can be more independent of their clients than private lawyers, since they have 
no pecuniary interest in their cases. 
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4.5 At the other end of the spectrum are the NDPB jurisdictions which have no public 
defenders for independence and other reasons, such as the Netherlands, Ireland or 
NI.
29
 In the middle are jurisdictions such Scotland and England with a few public 
defenders  - but which allow clients a choice of public or private lawyers and New 
South Wales and Victoria which do not. The most recent proposal in E & W that 
criminal legal aid contracts should be allocated on the basis of price competitive 
tendering ( PCT ) would have entailed the disappearance of client choice in criminal 
cases.
30
 However, rather unexpectedly the Lord Chancellor ( Grayling ) stepped back 
from the brink following discussions with the Law Society and abandoned both PCT 
and the deprivation of client choice.
31
 On the civil side there seems to be less concern 
about the independence of the salaried lawyers employed by the LAA, even where 
they are acting against the Government. Thus in Ireland (as in NSW and Victoria) 
assisted clients in civil cases  cannot choose whether they go to a public lawyer or a 
private lawyer.  In the Netherlands the LAB staff do not deliver even civil legal aid 
services. However the Board controls the 30 legal aid offices “Lokets” and their 
staff, who do provide initial legal advice to the public. To preserve their 
independence the Lokets comprise a single organisation with its own independent 
legal persona with 30 branches.  
 
 5. The independence of the process for granting or refusing legal aid  
 
5.1 Irrespective of where a LAA lies on the spectrum of institutional independence, the 
key question is what measures exist to ensure the absolute operational autonomy of 
the LAA to grant, refuse or withdraw legal aid applications independent of any 
interference by its sponsoring Ministry, or indeed any other external influence ( e.g. 
the media ) or  another Government Ministry.   One of the greatest protections is a 
cultural one in that in every one of the jurisdictions studied the LAA staff and the 
Ministry civil servants shared the normative understanding that Government 
interference in relation to individual cases was simply not acceptable. This is 
understandable in the case of NDPB LAA but the strength of feeling was equally 
apparent where the LAA was located within the Ministry. In none of the jurisdictions 
studied was there a formal power for the Minister of the sponsoring Department to 
intervene in individual cases. Indeed, in a range of them (e.g. Ireland, E & W, NI) 
there is an express statutory provision against this happening e.g. The Civil Legal 
Aid Act 1995 s.7 (3) in Ireland provides that nothing in the Act shall enable the 
Minister to exercise any power or control in relation to any particular legal aid case. 
In the countries where no such provision is on the statute book, there is often 
counsel‟s opinion which shows why the legislation does not implicitly allow such 
interference in individual cases.   
 
                                                 
29
 Whilst British Columbia used to have public defenders and no longer does, this was due to austerity 
measures. Ontario does not yet have a public defender programme but, like BC, it employs a reasonable 
number  of salaried  duty counsel doing criminal and family work. However, the client has a free choice 
between duty counsel and a private lawyer. 
30
 Proposals for the Reform of Legal Aid in England and Wales (Ministry of Justice, March, 2013). 
31
 Transforming Legal Aid : Next Steps ( MOJ, September,2013) 
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5.2 Although all the jurisdictions recounted stories of assisted cases which were an 
embarrassment or an irritation to the Ministry e.g asylum cases, prisoner human 
rights cases,
32
 deportation of foreign prisoners or the judicial review of alleged 
torture of terrorist suspects, none could provide examples of Ministers seeking 
formally to instruct  the LAA to refuse to fund such cases or to withdraw funding 
from such cases.
33
 The nearest examples were the Evans case
34
 (see below) and a 
case in another country where there was an application for legal aid by someone 
accused in a civil action of being responsible for multiple deaths following a terrorist 
bomb incident. A Government minster (who was not the minster for the sponsoring 
department ) wrote complaining as to award of the legal aid application, and 
requesting that the certificate be revoked. The LAA wrote back to indicate firmly but 
politely that the matter was nothing to do with him.  
 
5.3 However, what is the position behind the scenes? Do Governments seek to apply 
pressure informally on LAA in particular cases? Here there have been occasional 
instances where Ministers have expressed informal concerns about legal aid being 
granted in a case which was embarrassing to Government. In one jurisdiction the 
LAA CEO could recall senior civil servants expressing disquiet to him about the 
granting of legal aid in one or two such cases, but immediately adding that they were 
aware, of course, that the LAA was independent of Government.  Another civil 
servant in the MOJ of a country with an NDPB LAA confirmed that  he had on a 
number of occasions had to remind Ministers that it was not open to them to make 
comments in prisoner human rights cases suggesting that they should not get legal 
aid, or to interfere  to seek to stop them getting legal aid.  In that jurisdiction most of 
the politically difficult cases arise when those who are considered by the tabloid 
press to be “bad people” want legal aid e.g. a convicted offender  trying to keep a 
public benefit. This can lead to situations where the Minister feels under pressure 
from his backbenchers in Parliament and wants to be seen to do something. If he 
indicates that he will speak to the LAA about it, the response will be that the LAA 
informs the Minister‟s civil servants that such a conversation will not take place 
since the legislation prevents the Minister from interfering with decisions to grant or 
refuse legal aid. However, if the head of legal aid is a civil servant within the MOJ 
taking a stance in this way may not be so straightforward even if he or she is 
statutorily stated to be „indepenendent‟. 
      
5.4 The inability of Governments to intervene in relation to individual cases, does not 
tell the whole story, since in some jurisdictions ( e.g. Ireland, Victoria ) the Ministry 
has the power
35
 to give “such general directives to the LAB as to policy in relation to 
legal aid and advice as he or she considers necessary” and this can extend to 
guidance as to which categories of civil cases should be prioritised.
36
 Similarly in NI 
                                                 
32
 Relating to a prisoner‟s right to vote or to basic amenities in their cells. 
33
 This is not to deny that in some jurisdictions the Government e.g. in E & W is seeking to restrict the right 
to challenge certain Government decisions which, if successful, will reduce the availability of legal aid in 
such cases.   
34
 [2011] EWHC 1146 
35
 See e.g The Irish Civil Legal Aid Act 1995 s 7(1) 
36
 Victoria Legal Aid Act 1978 s.12M ( as amended ). 
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the Justice Department has the power
37
 to give guidance to the NILSC as to the 
general performance of its functions and this too would extend to guidance as to 
prioritisation of civil cases, however, as in Ireland and Victoria the legislation 
expressly states that this power does not extend to individual cases. The latest NI 
proposals indicate that this will remain the position with all Ministerial guidance and 
direction communicated to stakeholders and often only after consultation with 
them.
38
 As against this the Funding code
39
 in NI and  E & W places the LAA under a 
duty to take account of the public interest when deciding whether to fund a case. 
Presumably the guidance from the Ministry could stipulate that the “public interest” 
should include the interest of the state or the economy, although such a suggestion 
would be very unlikely and highly controversial.  
 
5.5 The Ministry could, of course, like all Justice Ministries exclude a complete category 
of case from legal aid scope e.g divorce, defamation, money claims, if it had the 
parliamentary votes to change the legislative provisions and provided the reform 
could withstand judicial review or it did not infringe the human rights of their 
citizens under Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. A very clear 
example where this power became mixed up with a Government‟s desire to influence 
the granting of legal aid in particular cases was the Evans case.
40
 Here a petitioner in 
England issued judicial review proceedings against the Secretary of State for 
Defence, claiming that it was unlawful for United Kingdom officials to hand over 
captured detainees in Afghanistan to the intelligence services because to do so would 
expose them to a real risk of torture. Subsequently, the Government lawyers wrote to 
the NDPB LAA (the Legal Services Commission) of E & W asking them to 
"reconsider whether [the claimant] should be granted legal aid for the purposes of her 
threatened application for judicial review". However, the LSC refused to buckle 
under Government pressure and at length granted public funding for the challenge.
41
  
 
5.6 That, regrettably, was not the end of the story. The Minister for Defence then wrote 
to, and subsequently met with the Justice Minister and persuaded him to change the 
legal aid regulations (ostensibly on the grounds of saving money ) to make it much 
harder for individuals such as Ms Evans who did not have a personal ( as opposed to 
a public ) interest to obtain legal aid to challenge the Government in its dealings with 
detainees in Iraq and Afghanistan. The amendment was subject to a further judicial 
review by Ms Evans.  The lead judge
42
 rejected the purported amendments to the 
Funding Code with the robust observation: “ In plain language [ the Minister of 
Defence‟s letter ] seems to me to assert that the consequences of an adverse result in 
such a public interest judicial review is a good reason for the denial of public funding 
to bring the case. It needs no authority to conclude that by law such a position is not 
                                                 
37
 Access to Justice (NI) Order 2003 article 8 
38
 Summary of Responses and Way Forward: Safeguards to protect the individual decisions on the granting 
of civil legal aid consultation ( NI Department of Justice, June 2013 ). 
39
 Which governs the merits test for legal aid eligibility. 
40
 [2011] EWHC 1146 
41
 Had these events occurred in 2013 when the LSC had become an Agency in the MOJ this robust 
response might not have been so easily achieved.  
42
 See Lord Justice Laws in Evans v S of State [2011] EWHC 1146 
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open to Government. For the State to inhibit litigation by the denial of legal aid 
because the court's judgment might be unwelcome or apparently damaging would 
constitute an attempt to influence the incidence of judicial decisions in the interests 
of Government. It would therefore be frankly inimical to the rule of law.” 
 
5.7 Government involvement in the award of legal aid in individual cases is not always 
as suspect as it was in the Evans case. Thus in NI the Justice Minister can direct the 
NILSC to provide legal aid in exceptional funding cases that would otherwise be 
outside of scope.  The provision also allows the NILSC to recommend to the 
Minister that he authorise legal aid in any proceedings which would not otherwise 
qualify.  The Minister has indicated that he would expect such cases to have a 
significant wider public interest and be of overwhelming importance to the client.     
 
5.8 Such an overt involvement of a Justice Minister in granting legal aid is very unusual, 
even if it appears benign. More often, as we have seen, jurisdictions seek to 
immunise the granting, refusing or withdrawal of legal aid applications by the LAA 
from Government interference. One further way to achieve this – which is becoming 
rarer in the surveyed jurisdictions - is to leave the granting of legal aid in certain 
types of case (usually criminal cases ) with the courts. However, the consistent trend 
in jurisdictions is to take such decisions away from the courts because it is much 
harder to achieve consistency and predictability of decision than if it is given to the 
LAA. That said, in both Australia
43
 and Canada the courts have the power to stay 
criminal proceedings if they consider that representation is required to ensure a fair 
trial. This has prompted Governments to provide funding (administered by the LAA 
) for the representation, whether or not the accused qualifies for legal aid in the 
normal way. 
 
5.9 An additional factor which reduces the temptation for Governments to intrude on 
decisions in individual cases, is the fact that in all of the surveyed jurisdictions there 
is a requirement that LAA keep the case and personal details of those applying for, or 
receiving legal aid, confidential.
44
  However, this blanket protection can come under 
threat from the desire of LAA CEOs to retain a reasonable working relationship with 
their sponsoring Ministry. Generally speaking, therefore, CEOs will provide a 
warning to their Ministries of significant cases involving Government interests or 
potential embarrassment which have come to their attention – without providing 
details of the individuals concerned. Whilst this may seem a reasonable balance to 
strike in a few cases a year,  one LAA who had received legal advice that their duty 
to furnish reports to the Minister “on any matter relating to legal aid” covered the 
details of individual applicants and their cases, found itself discussing 3 or 4 cases a 
week with its sponsoring Ministry (without permitting them any say in the disposal 
of the application ), in order to forewarn the Minister of matters that he might be 
questioned about by parliamentarians. This is not a position with which most of the 
jurisdictions surveyed would be comfortable and shows the importance of having the 
                                                 
43
 Dietrich v The Queen [1992] HCA 57 ( The High Court ). 
44
 See e.g. Access to Justice (NI) Order 2003 article 32; Legal Aid, Advice and Assistance  (NI) Order 1981 
Art 24. 
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respective roles and responsibilities of the LAA and the Ministry enshrined in 
statute. 
 
5.10 The final protections for the operational independence of LAA are the provisions 
which govern the refusal of legal aid applications or the withdrawal of legal aid 
grants. In all of the jurisdictions the disappointed member of the public can ask for 
an internal review of the decision – usually by a more senior LAA official. If that 
does not succeed there is the potential for a review by a committee. In some cases the 
committee is outside the LAA made up of independent lawyers and laypersons (NI, 
Ontario
45
 and NSW
46
) in others it is a Committee of the LAA composed (as in 
Ireland) of just Board members, or Board members plus external lawyers or (in the 
Netherlands ) the judiciary.
47
 If the review rejects the appeal, the applicant in the 
Netherlands has a right of appeal to the Administrative Court and then on to the 
Highest court. In some cases legal aid can be awarded to fund these appeals. More 
typically in other jurisdictions refusals to grant legal aid are open to challenge by 
way of judicial review through the courts. However the operation of the legal aid 
merits test would make it unlikely for such a challenge to receive legal aid (Ontario, 
NSW, Victoria ).  
 
5.11 In NI applications for legal aid to mount a judicial review against the LAA for 
refusing to grant legal aid or for withdrawing a grant are considered by a Special 
Committee of external lawyers which is independent of the LAA and the appeals 
panel and considers applications for legal aid in any proceedings against the 
Commission.
48
 In Scotland the initial reviews are internal to the LAB and have a 
better than even chance of success.
49
 However, where the case may be controversial 
or contentious e.g. where legal aid is sought to sue the Government, the case will go 
to a Committee
50
 of Board members and external lawyers. Applicants who are turned 
down by the Committee may seek to judicially review the LAB for not granting legal 
aid. In such instances the case will be sent to a senior judge for a ruling. It is rare for 
such appeals to lead to a grant of legal aid. In all there have been only been a handful 
of   cases where legal aid has been granted for judicially reviewing the LAB‟s 
decision not to grant legal aid to a party. 
 
5.12 The above descriptions of the autonomy of LAA in relation to granting, refusing or 
withdrawal of grants of legal aid have been taken from jurisdictions where the LAA 
is located outside their sponsoring Government Ministry. It would seem a reasonable 
hypothesis to posit that the operational autonomy of LAA located within 
Government Departments will be more curtailed than that of LAA outside 
Government. Certainly it has been the area which has troubled the Governments in  
                                                 
45
 After the independent area committees the final appeal goes to the Director of Appeals in the LAA.  
46
 In NSW the committee also has a lawyer for the Ministry. The committees uphold 10-155 of appeals. 
47
 In almost every case the Dutch LAA accepts the recommendations of this review committee. 
48
 In Victoria such appeals go to an independent review by a nominee of the Attorney General. 
49
 This is not necessarily an indication that the original refusal was wrong. Often it is because the solicitor 
has provided the further and better particulars required to enable the grant to be given. 
50
 The Services Cases Committee – it deals with only 150 or so cases a year – although refusals of civil 
legal aid applications  are running at  6,000 a year. 
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NZ, E & W and NI who have or are considering bringing their LAA inside 
Government. In NZ the legislation has created a statutory official – the Legal 
Services Commissioner – a career civil servant within the MOJ who is responsible to 
the Secretary for Justice (the top civil servant within the MOJ) to take decisions on 
applications. There is also a new Legal Aid Review Panel located within the 
tribunals unit of the MOJ, to deal with appeals against refusals of legal aid.
51 
In NI it 
is proposed that the CEO would become statutorily required to make decisions on 
legal aid applications independently, without any input from the Minister, any 
political institution or staff in the core of the Justice Department. The suggestion of 
an Advisory Council to handle appeals from refusals has now been abandoned but 
the Ministry‟s current proposal52 is that appeals from the statutory office holder will 
go to an independent panel of three individuals selected by public appointments 
procedures. At least one of the individuals will have to be a lawyer.    
 
5.13 England and Wales similarly have a departmental head with statutory independence 
however the Government ruled out paying for an independent review panel as in NZ 
and as proposed in NI, on expense grounds. Rather appeal is to a civil servant within 
the Ministry. It would be fair to say that a number of CEOs in the surveyed 
jurisdictions were sceptical as to the effective independence of a structure where the 
civil servant‟s promotion prospects and career progression is dependent on not 
falling out with their immediate supervisor or the Minister. The situation would be 
even more problematic if legal aid is being sought to judicially review the Justice 
Minister. Given that the test of impartiality focuses on the appearance of impropriety 
as much as any impropriety itself, it is perhaps understandable that several CEOs 
expressed doubt that a senior civil servant within the Justice Minister‟s department 
would be totally impartial in that situation. Without a robust appeal mechanism the 
English and Welsh Government could be opening itself up to political battles on a 
secondary front (the funding issue) when the original challenge might not be a strong 
one in the first place.   
 
5.14 It is rather too early to comment on how the independence of LAA which have 
moved into Government Departments in recent years, is working out. In NZ the 
Court of Appeal in 2013 ruled that the Minister in implementing a Criminal Fixed 
Fee and Complex Cases Policy was acting inconsistently with the Legal Services 
Commissioner‟s independence and fettering his discretion.53 However, the success of 
the challenge seems to have turned on the particular wording of the Commissioner‟s 
remit which can easily be revised, thus it may not presage a rash of challenges to the 
independence of the new LAA agencies within Government departments. 
 
5.15Interestingly, however, Finland, the jurisdiction which has operated inside its 
sponsoring Ministry for longest has developed robust mechanisms for independent 
                                                 
51
 The members of the panel are appointed by the Minister without a public appointments procedure and are 
unfortunately not well remunerated. 
52
 Summary of Responses and Way Forward: Safeguards to protect the individual decisions on the granting 
of civil legal aid consultation ( NI Department of Justice, June 2013 ) para 26. 
53
 Criminal Bar Association of New Zealand v AG [2013] NZCA 176. 
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decision-making. First, refusals of legal aid are not (as in Ireland ) centralised but 
concentrated in each of the 41 local legal aid offices. These are independent of each 
other (each has its own budget)  and of the Ministry and there is no central 
association or body of legal offices. There is no formal mechanism by which the 
MOJ could seek to get an application for legal aid accepted, or to have it rejected. 
The legal provisions do not allow for it. Nor have there been informal attempts in 
recent years. The MOJ can neither provide general guidance on the awarding of legal 
aid nor specific guidance in an individual case. They could only alter the scope of 
legal aid by changing the legislation or regulations in the normal way to exclude a 
whole category of cases. As elsewhere the legal aid offices are under an obligation to 
keep details as to those who have applied for legal aid and in what cases, 
confidential.  If legal aid is refused to an applicant by the legal aid office, the 
applicant can request an internal review. Thereafter they can  appeal to the District 
Court against the refusal and from there to the Court of Appeal or even the Supreme 
Court.  There is no formal provision for legal aid in an appeal against the refusal of 
legal aid, although it may be awarded in practice. There is no record of legal aid 
having been given for an appeal to the Supreme Court against a refusal to grant legal 
aid.  In the great majority of appeals against the refusal to award legal aid, the 
applicant will represent themselves or a lawyer will act for them pro bono. Finally, 
the payment of fees for private lawyers are decided by courts and paid by the MOJ. 
That money is open ended although the budget for the legal aid offices is capped.   
 
 
 6. Access to Justice Policy 
 
6.1 Quintessentially policymaking is a Government function. For jurisdictions where the 
LAA is situated within the Ministry (Finland and NZ)  therefore, there is no 
disjunction between the location of the LAA and the policymaking function. For the 
NDPB jurisdictions, however, there is a constant tension between the institutional 
autonomy of the NDPB and the policymaking function. The standard division of 
labour has been to make the NDPB LAA responsible for day to day policy and the 
Ministry responsible for strategic planning. However, this does not always mitigate 
the tension since the expertise in relation to legal aid largely resides within the 
LAA.
54
  This can lead, as it did in E & W to a situation where for long stretches the 
Ministry found it difficult to fix on a settled strategic policy and then to stick to it.
55
 
Unsurprisingly the LSC response was to build up its own policymaking team. This 
approach, however, was always likely to be a cause of friction unless the LAA was 
able to manage its relations with its Ministry. Thus in 2010 one of the reasons stated 
in the Magee report for moving the  LSC into the MOJ
 
 was because the policy unit 
in the LSC was of a size and significance that it duplicated the capacity within the 
Ministry and did not always agree with it.  
                                                 
54
 This may be due to over-rapid civil servant rotation, cuts in staff within the Ministry or simply because 
the LAA is at the coalface.  
55
 There were seven major policy initiatives by the Ministry in the nine years between 1986 to 1995 and in 
the next fifteen years there were nine reports, with thirty consultations between 2006 and 2010 alone. See 
A. Paterson, Lawyers and the Public Good ( Cambridge University Press, 2012 ) at p.86. 
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6.2 However, in Canada and in Australia there are signs that the policymaking function 
at the level of state or provincial Government is on the wane
56
 – the ground is being 
ceded to the LAAs. Indeed, in the Australian states and territories generally strategic 
planning in legal aid is now more the function of the LAA several of whom have 
been given control over the three principal levers, scope, eligibility and payment 
rates and can adjust them whenever rationing is required. This degree of apparent 
autonomy has to be understood in the political context of legal aid in Australia. 
Eligibility limits are relatively low and the standard budgetary settlements from 
Government tend not to err on the generous side. Without the ability to run with a 
deficit for any length of time, and little ability to cater for downstream legal aid costs 
caused by the activities of others in the justice system,  the LAA can be forced into 
rationing – or threatening to ration mid-year and relying on the protests from the 
profession and the media to cajole more money out of the Government. Nevertheless, 
the outcome in Canada and Australia has been that on occasion the more autonomous 
NDPB LAA are more strategic in their long term thinking about legal aid than their 
sponsoring Ministries.  
 
6.3 Two of the most successful jurisdictions with institutionally independent LAA are 
Scotland and the Netherlands. Both LAA have managed to avoid the fate of E & W 
LSC in that they have succeeded in building up a policy team within their LAA 
without alienating their Ministries. In Scotland the level of trust between the 
Ministry and the LAA is such that the LAA has more policy staff and more dedicated 
research capacity than the parent Ministry. This works well, in part because decisions 
on overall policy are for Ministers.
57
 Similarly in the Netherlands by retaining 
research and policy analysts on the LAB‟s staff they are able to monitor trends and 
statistics and through the LAB Directors can feed ideas for the future development of 
legal aid policy e.g. the introduction of the Lokets or the withdrawal of legal aid for 
trivial matters, into the MOJ.
58
 In both Scotland and the Netherlands the LAA will 
monitor legislation for legal aid impact and discuss this with their Ministry. Indeed in 
both jurisdictions the leaders of the LAA will meet with their Ministries at very 
regular intervals to discuss long and short term issues and to advise them about 
holistic reform of the justice system, proposing changes in legal procedures, court 
organisation, simplifying the law, and engaging with other Government departments 
                                                 
56
 Whilst in both countries the federal authorities provide a minority of the LAA‟s funding their policy 
interests tend to be confined to the areas for which they are providing resources e.g. high cost criminal 
cases, refugee and asylum cases and some family cases. 
57
 Part of the success of Scotland here is due to the clarity of the legislation which sets out that whilst 
Ministers are responsible for overall legal aid policy, the Scottish LAA has a duty to advise Ministers on 
the operation of legal aid, including possible policy developments. 
58
 Recently the MOJ proposed to make the percentage of the population eligible for legal aid (40% ) the 
same as those eligible for assistance with court fees. The LAB persuaded them that that would produce too 
steep a cut off, and that 60% of the population should be eligible for assistance with court fees. The Board 
had the ability to identify who those 60% were, making things easier for the MOJ. 
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to eliminate costly decisions, in order to promote more cost-effective access to 
justice programmes.
59
     
 
  Access to justice dialogues 
 
6.4 Whilst some NDPB LAA may have a surprising degree of input into legal aid policy 
in their jurisdiction, such a degree of autonomy is not always accompanied by a 
similarly high degree of financial autonomy.  This is because policy autonomy has 
less salience politically if budgets are kept tight with little room for manoeuvre if 
there is unexpected demand, possibly the result of other initiatives in the justice 
system that the LAA does not control.  All it does is to transfer the opprobrium when 
the fund threatens to run out part way through the year onto the LAA rather than the 
Minister. Moreover, implementing day to day policy that puts the LAA into 
persistent deficit is a sure way of provoking the Minister into counter measures 
aimed at the institutional autonomy of the LAA or at its administrative budget.  
 
6.5 Governments and Ministers do not like adverse media comment on areas that fall 
within their responsibility. Not surprisingly therefore that some of the sponsoring 
Ministries of the jurisdictions which were surveyed tended to be more concerned 
about the way the LAA engaged with them (and other stakeholders ) than the fact 
that they were handling policy matters.  Thus the Ministry may have no objection to 
the LAA engaging with them in private about the low levels of financial eligibility in 
that jurisdiction but will tend to be much more sensitive if the matter appears in the 
LAA Annual Report or if the LAA starts to overtly lobby members of parliament on 
the matter. Similarly in a jurisdiction where the publicly salaried lawyers of the LAA 
are paid rather less than those in the Ministry, private memos asking permission to 
pay them more  will be tolerated  much more than an attempted alliance with the 
legal profession to apply pressure on the Minister. 
 
6.6 In jurisdictions where the CEO and the Board have limited security of tenure such an 
overt challenge might be counter-productive. Even in jurisdictions where the security 
of tenure is stronger, courage comes with a price. In one country the Ministry wished 
to introduce a “full cost recovery” strategy – under which the parties are required to 
pay the full cost of using the courts including the buildings, the staff and the judicial 
salaries. The key stakeholders in the Access to Justice field and some of the other 
Government Ministries, opposed this proposed change. The LAA leaders signed a 
petition to the Parliament with other stakeholder opponents of the new policy, 
including the legal profession. This was not well received within the Ministry who 
took the view that the LAA should not openly attack their Minister, and veiled 
budgetary threats were made. The LAA took the view that the position of legal aid 
clients was at stake and if the Ministry chose not choose to consult and negotiate 
with stakeholders before announcing a policy change they should not be surprised if 
the LAA, amongst others, conducted the debate in public.  
 
                                                 
59
 In fairness it should be noted that some other jurisdictions give their LAA the duty to advise their 
sponsoring Minister on matters related to legal aid and access to justice, e.g British Columbia. 
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6.7 As several of the participating NDPB CEOs observed when discussing independence 
from Government, LAA which are outside Government are in a stronger position to 
engage with the media, form alliances with other stakeholders, to respond critically 
to consultation papers or to appear before parliamentary committees in situations 
where the Minister is planning to introduce major changes to legal aid, than if their 
LAA was re-located within the Ministry and their career prospects could be 
threatened.
60
  Whilst this seems entirely convincing, Finland offers a counter-
example. There  the staff members and lawyers in the local public legal aid offices 
are free to oppose policy initiatives from the Ministry and may combine with other 
stakeholders (e.g. the Bar) to lobby the Ministry or members of parliament. This 
freedom of expression is not resented by the Government and is protected by the 
trade unions. However, it seems more likely that this is attributable to the culture of 
public engagement which pervades the civil service in Finland.  
 
 7. Budgeting and Financial Independence 
 
7.1 Governments may cede large measures of institutional, operational and policy 
making autonomy to NDPB LAA  as we have seen, however, they are more wary 
when it comes to financial independence. Like any substantial form of public 
expenditure, legal aid is expected by the Treasury to be demonstrably cost-effective 
and value for money. None of the jurisdictions examined in this study demonstrated 
financial autonomy in the sense that their budgets were derived largely from non-
Government funding or even a ring-fenced pot of Government money (such as is 
used to fund the judiciary) which is protected from significant parliamentary 
scrutiny.  Rather the financial autonomy relates to the restrictions imposed by the 
Ministry as to annual levels of spend on cases, staff and on administration, and the 
constraints on the LAA‟s freedom to spend as they see fit within these limits. It is 
here that the importance of having a good working relationship with the Ministry 
comes into its own.  
 
7.2 The trend in legal aid jurisdictions is for budgets relating to cases to be capped 
(although sometimes this will only apply to civil cases, with the level of criminal 
legal aid spend remaining uncapped). This stems not just from difficulties of coping 
with an open ended commitment but also from the habit  which grew up in a wide 
range of jurisdictions of the LAA underestimating their expenditure by substantial 
margins (up to 25%) on a year on year basis. As money got tighter such practices 
were frowned on. In order to make the cap stick Ministries generally restrict the 
ability for LAA to operate with a deficit of any significance, for any appreciable 
period, and reinforce this by holding the CEO as accountable officer closely to 
account.
61
 One commentator in Australia was of the opinion that if a LAA ran out of 
money during the year the CEO would be likely to be disciplined or even sacked. In 
                                                 
60
 One NDPB CEO observed that he could organise to meet with his Minister quite easily, but that if he 
were a departmental head within the Ministry he would find the senior civil servant in the Ministry and the 
Minister‟s staff blocking his path to similar access to the Minister. The counter –argument that if you are 
within the Ministry you will hear of the Minster‟s proposals first did not convince many external CEOs. 
61
 Some LAA have responded by establishing small reserves to cushion themselves against a deficit. 
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BC the legislation is understood to make the Chair and the CEO personally liable if 
the LAA runs a deficit and it may even be an  offence. This provision has never been 
put to the test but it must give an edge to discussions with the Ministry as to whether 
the CEO and LAA can be indemnified if there is a budgetary shortfall caused by an 
unanticipated growth in demand in a field of law, perhaps prompted by the actions of 
another Government Ministry. However, pressure is a two way street. If the budget 
in a country covers 800 refugee cases a year and 500 arrive on one boat in one day, 
the LAA is likely to inform the relevant Ministry that unless more money is 
forthcoming there will be no representation in court for any of the 500 and the 
immigration service will have to be shut down. The efficacy of such tactics turns in 
part on the ability of the LAA to speak publicly about the problem to stakeholders 
and the media,
62
 an option which might not be available were the LAA to be inside 
Government. 
 
7.3 Budget caps have led to two developments. First, the block grant for legal aid in 
Australia and Canada tends to come as fixed sum equivalent to legal aid spend in the 
previous year plus an allowance for inflation. As Treasuries try to hold down 
expenditure, LAAs will tend to find that the allowance for inflation has been 
downrated because of required efficiency savings. Particularly where the LAA is 
lumped into a cluster of other justice budgets, inter-departmental skirmishes are 
likely to emerge, partly reducing the advantages of the NDPB LAA‟s institutional 
autonomy in budgetary negotiations with the Ministry as compared with the LAA 
which is inside the Ministry.  
 
7.4 Secondly, budget caps have meant, unsurprisingly, that in recent years LAA have 
been focusing on improving their projections for spend on cases in different 
categories throughout the year. In the past the cap meant that legal aid grants in 
certain types of cases e.g. divorces would not be available in the later parts of a year, 
if it became clear that the funds would not stretch. Such crude, and high profile, 
forms of rationing are less common now because LAA have a better ability to predict 
expenditure overshoots which enables them to cut back in grants in low priority 
matters or by tightening the means test. However, in one jurisdiction the need to stay 
within the capped budget has led to the waiting time for legal aid appointments with 
staff or private lawyers now extending into months and plans are being considered to 
introduce a form of triage for clients at an earlier stage.    
  
7.5 Countries where there is still an open ended, uncapped, demand led legal aid budget 
are becoming scarcer and are usually successful programmes where there is a good 
working relationship (and a large measure of trust) between the LAA and the 
sponsoring Ministry. Scotland and the Netherlands are two such jurisdictions.
63
  In 
the Netherlands the MOJ ultimately sets the budget based on a formula contained in 
Regulations which include the volume of cases in the past year and the unit price for 
pieces of work. The Board can negotiate with the MOJ on the basis of its figures and 
its understanding of the market. It has an excellent track record in projecting its 
                                                 
62
 Given the political nature of decisions like this, the Board and Chair would always be involved.  
63
 So too is NI, but it may be destined to move into its sponsoring Ministry.   
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outturn accurately. Since the MOJ can rely on the detailed facts and the figures of the 
LAB they can predict the cost of the legal aid budget in advance and place 
themselves in a good position when it comes to dealing with the Ministry of Finance 
and have time to make proposals for changes if needed. 
 
7.6 In Scotland the Government sets the estimated level of spend in consultation with the 
Scottish Legal Aid Board ( SLAB) and there is a three year spending review on a 
rolling basis from which SLAB develops its corporate plan stating what its projected 
spend is for the next few years. In the years of the recession there have been 
considerable “overspends” on the civil side but these were predicted since SLAB has 
developed forms of trend planning to warn the SG in advance of the likely 
“overspend or undershoot” in expenditure.64  As in E & W substantial cuts have been 
forced upon the MOJ /Justice Department as austerity measures. In Scotland the 
CEO of SLAB has worked closely with other stakeholders and the Government, 
whilst   appearing before Parliamentary committees, to show how the cuts could be 
implemented. Reflecting SLAB‟s role in relation to policymaking (see above) 
SLAB‟s CEO has undoubtedly had far more input into the distribution and operation 
of the cuts than his English counterpart. As in E & W however, the political fallout 
for the cuts and their implementation (unlike Australia or Canada) falls on the 
Ministry. The CEO of the Netherlands LAB has played a similar role in shaping 
proposals for the MOJ as to how best to implement austerity measures. It is difficult 
to envisage how the CEO of a LAA within a MOJ would be able to play as high 
status and high profile role in defending legal aid expenditure.      
 
7.7 Financial independence in relation to an LAA‟s administrative budget is even harder 
to protect than the cases budget. In times of austerity the Ministry will expect even 
greater efficiency savings than in the case of the Legal Aid Fund, or will be offered it 
by experienced CEOs. However, in economically stronger times the administrative 
budget is still vulnerable from attack from the Minister if the LAA has resisted his 
pressure on any significant matters. Even where the administrative budget is renewed 
at a reasonable level, in some jurisdictions (and  not just those where the LAA is 
within the Ministry )  the  Minster may be able to influence or control the number, 
grade and pay of the LAA staff (including their public lawyers) or what the research 
budget is spent on. Nonetheless where a LAA is not constrained by its Ministry as to 
how to divide its administrative budget between salaried lawyers and the private bar 
(including the imposition of cuts) the need to retain good relations with the private 
profession may inhibit the LAA from seeking to keep down redundancies for its 
salaried staff by cutting back more severely in the use of private lawyers.  
 
 8. Conclusion: 
 
8.1 In terms of factors which effect institutional, operational and financial independence 
the following emerges from this survey of jurisdictions. 
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 SLAB tell the SG on a monthly basis what their forecasts are for next 12 months and every quarter go 
into much greater detail and adjust their projections. 
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Institutional autonomy 
 
8.2 The experience of the overseas jurisdictions indicates that most, but not all, LAA 
have an NDPB structure with either an executive Board of directors or a stakeholder 
Board. The use of a public appointments process ( with a reasonable security of 
tenure )  in the recruitment of the Board and Chair provides the greatest autonomy 
from Government although stakeholder nomination against a skills and competencies 
framework is also considered to bring a reasonable measure of autonomy. Similarly, 
CEOs who are appointed by Boards using a form of public appointments procedure, 
with robust security of tenure  ( perhaps with a separate financial responsibility as 
Accountable Officer to Parliament ) are seen as having the greatest degree of 
institutional independence. If the preference is to locate the LAA within Government 
then the more autonomous option is the “non-Ministerial department” along the lines 
proposed by a recent review
65
 in NI with a small executive board of senior managers 
together with an Advisory Council selected by a public appointments procedure. The 
role of the Advisory Council might cover ensuring the independence of decision-
making by the LAA in relation to grants, refusals and withdrawals of legal aid, acting 
as an appeals panel for complex and difficult cases and as a source of independent 
advice for the Government on Access to Justice matters.  The lay chair might also 
serve as non-executive director on the management board. Regrettably this is not the 
model that NI seems likely to take.
66
 
   
Accountability 
 
8.3 Whilst there will always be a tension between accountability and independence, 
provided suitable structures and processes are in place ( preferably  enshrined in 
legislation ) to preserve the autonomy of the LAA and its senior staff (which will 
support a good working relationship between the LAA and the Government) 
accountability mechanisms – including independent monitoring need not inhibit the 
proper functioning of the LAA. 
 
Staffing 
 
8.4 The evidence from overseas countries suggests that in small jurisdictions there can 
be  difficulties in recruitment at senior levels or in acquiring the flexible skills set 
needed for today‟s complex legal aid programmes (as there have been in NI and NZ), 
if the staff  is not composed of civil servants – irrespective of whether the LAA is an 
NDPB (e.g. Ireland). However, NDPB LAAs are considered to be more autonomous 
where the Government does not seek to control the number, grade, salary and 
pension entitlement of LAA staff.  The evidence from other jurisdictions, however, 
does not suggest that the use of salaried public lawyers poses significant threats to 
the operational autonomy of the LAA.  
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 Access to Justice Review, Northern Ireland. August 2011 par 7.22. 
66
 Summary of Responses and Way Forward: Safeguards to protect the individual decisions on the granting 
of civil legal aid consultation ( NI Department of Justice, June 2013 ). 
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Grant giving independence 
 
8.5 The key protections of independence here are legislative and cultural, but in the view 
of most jurisdictions surveyed, ( though not in Finland ) the threat of Governmental 
interference with individual legal aid grants or withdrawals is seen as higher where 
the LAA is within Government than where it is an NDPB. That said – wherever the 
LAA is situated – there are a range of measures that are considered to enhance 
autonomy ( especially if they are contained in legislation ):  
 a) a legal prohibition on the Government interfering with the grant, refusal  or 
withdrawal of legal aid in individual cases; 
 b)  clear limits on any power of the Government to give guidance to the LAA as to 
its functions in relation to grant giving and payments; 
 c)  clarification that any references to “the public interest” in the merits test for legal 
aid cannot be read to mean interest of the state or state security, or the interests of the 
economy; 
 d)  a strengthening and clarification of the confidentiality obligation with clear limits 
as to what may be passed to the Government by the LAA as advanced warning of 
legal aid cases in the pipeline; 
 e)  a robust internal review system for refusals and withdrawals of legal aid, coupled 
with an appeal committee that is independent of Government and the LAA together 
with provision for a  review mechanism by a judge or the courts, where legal aid is 
being sought where the LAA or the Government is being legally challenged.   
  
Policymaking 
 
8.6  The general trend is to locate policymaking more in the hands of the LAA rather than 
the Government, except where the LAA is located inside the Government. This is 
thought to encourage autonomy and self-confidence without posing a threat to the 
Government  who still control financial independence. The general view was that 
LAAs which are outside Government are in a stronger position to engage with the 
media, form alliances with other stakeholders, respond critically to consultation 
papers or to appear before parliamentary committees in situations where the 
Government is planning to introduce major changes to legal aid, than if their LAA 
was in the Government.  
 
Budgeting and Financial independence  
 
8.7  Finally, although no jurisdiction affords its LAA complete budgetary autonomy, 
some LAAs are afforded considerably more independence than others. Whilst most 
now operate in an environment of budget caps and rationing, it is still possible to be 
an open-ended uncapped demand led jurisdiction provided the LAA retains the 
confidence and trust of its Government.    
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  Coda 
 
9.1 Although structures and  institutional, operational and financial protections can have 
an impact on autonomy, in the last analysis a LAA will only be as independent as its 
Board, Chair and CEO are determined that it shall be. An NDPB Board can fail to 
stand up to its Minister whilst a civil servant in charge of an LAA within the 
Ministry may be prepared to risk his / her career to preserve the independence of 
decision-making of the LAA.  Nonetheless, it is also the case that it is easier for 
Boards and CEOs of LAAs to exercise autonomy and to work constructively with 
their Ministries if they have all the relevant protections in place, than if they do not.  
  
 
